Improving access to maternity services: an overview of cash transfer and voucher schemes in South Asia by Jehan, Kate et al.
FEATUREImproving access to maternity services: an overview of
cash transfer and voucher schemes in South Asia
Kate Jehan,a Kristi Sidney,b Helen Smith,c Ayesha de Costad
a Researcher, International Health Group, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Liverpool, UK.
Correspondence: k.jehan@liverpool.ac.uk
b Researcher, Division of Global Health, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden
c Lecturer, International Health Group, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Liverpool, UK
d Researcher, RD Gardi Medical College, Surasa, Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh, India, and Researcher,
Division of Global Health, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, SwedenAbstract: In Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, policy focused on improving access to maternity
services has led to measures to reduce cost barriers impeding women’s access to care. Specifically, these
include cash transfer or voucher schemes designed to stimulate demand for services, including antenatal,
delivery and post-partum care. In spite of their popularity, however, little is known about the impact or
effectiveness of these schemes. This paper provides an overview of five major interventions: the Aama
(Mothers’) Programme (cash transfer element) in Nepal; the Janani Suraksha Yojana (Safe Motherhood
Scheme) in India; the Chiranjeevi Yojana (Scheme for Long Life) in India; the Maternal Health Voucher
Scheme in Bangladesh and the Sehat (Health) Voucher Scheme in Pakistan. It reviews the aims, rationale,
implementation challenges, known outcomes, potential and limitations of each scheme based on
current available data. Increased use of maternal health services has been reported since the schemes
began, though evidence of improvements in maternal health outcomes has not been established due
to a lack of controlled studies. Areas for improvement in these schemes, identified in this review, include
the need for more efficient operational management, clear guidelines, financial transparency, plans for
sustainability, evidence of equity and, above all, proven impact on quality of care and maternal
mortality and morbidity. © 2012 Reproductive Health Matters
Keywords: maternal health care, demand-side financing, health care financing, voucher,
cash transfer, South AsiaMaternal mortality and morbidity remain high in
Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and policy
in the region has focused increasingly on skilled
attendance at birth to reach Millennium Develop-
ment Goal 5.1–3 In these countries, however,women’s
uptake of maternal health care services remains
strongly associated with wealth, and high financial
costs are considered a major barrier in maternal
health care utilisation.1,3–6 Against this background,
governments and donors are exploring ways to
reduce cost barriers for pregnant women.5 Several
demand-side financing schemes, designed to stimu-
late demand for maternal health care, have been
implemented in South Asia. These include voucher
schemes, where all or part of the cost of services
are paid for specific groups, and cash transfer
schemes, where women are reimbursed for the costs142 Journal contents online: www.rhm-elsevof maternity services.2,7 In spite of the popularity
of these schemes with policymakers, there is as
yet insufficient evidence of their impact.8 Rigorous
evaluations are lacking, particularly evidence of
effects of the schemes on utilisation, targeting,
quality of care and maternal mortality and mor-
bidity. In most cases, data on outcomes (maternal,
perinatal and neonatal mortality) are limited or
not yet available, though some evidence is begin-
ning to emerge.
This paper provides an overview of five major
financing schemes designed to stimulate demand
for maternal health care in South Asia: the cash
transfer element of Nepal’s Aama Programme
(formerly Safe Delivery Incentive Programme);
India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana (Safe Motherhood
Scheme) and Chiranjeevi Yojana (Long Life Scheme);ier.com Doi: 10.1016/S0968-8080(12)39609-2
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Pakistan’s Sehat (Health) Voucher Scheme. It reviews
the aims, rationale, implementation challenges,
known outcomes, potential and limitations of each
scheme based on currently available data, lessons
learned to date and implications for health care
practitioners, policymakers, researchers and those
with an interest in widening access to maternal
health care in low- and middle-income settings.Methodology
We reviewed the literature on demand-side financ-
ing schemes for maternal health in South Asia,
and specifically, the characteristics of the different
schemes, how they are implemented and any known
impact on maternal mortality and other outcomes.
We included published journal articles including
systematic reviews of demand-side financing mech-
anisms more widely, primary research evaluating
demand-side financing schemes in South Asia as
well as reports from key international agencies
and governments, policy documents, and other
grey literature.
To identify published literature we performed
electronic searches of the following databases:
Scopus, Medline, Web of Science, Global Health,
CINHAL Plus and Applied Social Science Index. We
developed a comprehensive search strategy using
the following search terms, independently or
in combination, with no date restriction: wom*,
girl*, mother*, adolescent*, female*, demand-side
finance*, public-private partnership, PPP, cash
transfer*, money transfer*, CCT*, voucher*, mater-
nal health, reproductive health, pregnanc*, birth*,
maternal death*, maternal mortalit*, maternal
morbidit*, institutional deliver*, facility deliver*,
hospital deliver*, South Asia*, India*, Bangladesh*,
Pakistan*, Nepal*, Sri Lanka*, Bhutan*, Maldives*.
We screened titles and abstracts of all retrieved
articles (n=502) to identify those meeting our inclu-
sion criteria. We then scrutinised the full text of
these articles to identify relevant information. Over-
all, we included 38 published journal articles in the
review. We also searched Google for related reports
and grey literature, retrieving 14 reports, bulletins
and policy documents relevant to the review.*http://www.asap-asia.org/country-profile-nepal.html.Maternal health context and health care
utilisation trends
Across all four countries over two-thirds of health
expenditure occurs in the private sector at presentand out-of-pocket costs to patients are some of
the highest in the world.2,9,10 Consequently the
maternal health care needs of women are fre-
quently unmet, and maternal mortality rates are
amongst the highest globally.9 In the following
sections we provide a broad overview of each
country’s maternal health outlook and health care
utilisation trends over the past decade.
Nepal
Maternal health has been a key policy focus in
Nepal and the country has made some progress in
improving maternal health over the past decade.3
Recent figures suggest maternal mortality has
decreased from 550 per 100,000 live births in
2000 to 380 in 2008 (Figure 1). Though it has not
been possible to isolate the drivers of the recent
maternal mortality decline, it is likely to be partially
due to the legalisation of abortion in 2002.* Societal
changes in education and wealth also seem to have
contributed.11 In spite of this improvement, how-
ever, utilisation of maternal health services remains
low, with estimates of 19% of women delivering in a
facility.12 In mountainous areas, skilled birth atten-
dance is estimated at just 7%.3 A national free deliv-
ery policy was launched in Nepal in January 2009,143
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comes of this policy are still being monitored.13
India
India’s major problems affecting health care utili-
sation include a wide socioeconomic gap between
rich and poor and marked inequities in access to
health care. India as a whole has high numbers of
maternal and neonatal deaths.14–16 Between 1992
and 2006, two national surveys showed that the
proportion of institutional deliveries overall showed
little increase, from 26% to 41%.17,18 Nevertheless,
more recently India has driven the decline in the
maternal mortality ratio for South Asia (Figure 1), as
skilledbirthattendancehas increased inrecentyears.19
Pakistan
In Pakistan maternal health indicators have stag-
nated, and reduction in the maternal mortality ratio
has been slow (Figure 1).2 Critical problems in the
health sector include poor governance, insufficient
per capita health expenditure, and low capacity
and low coverage of skilled birth attendance.2 The
2007 Pakistan Demographic & Health Survey (DHS)
reported that 39% of women in small urban areas
had skilled attendance at birth, only a small increase
from the 35% reported in the 1990 survey.20,21 The
same surveys reported institutional delivery had
risen to 37% in 2007 from 13% in 1990.20,21
Bangladesh
Perhaps due to its rising income and education
levels, Bangladesh has seen a greater reduction
in its MMR than Pakistan.1 Despite this, most
births (79%) take place without skilled attendance
and the public sector is characterised by inade-
quate supplies and equipment, high absenteeism
and vacant posts.1 In Bangladesh, every year
about three million deliveries take place and
around 12,000 women die due to pregnancy-
related causes.22 While only 12% of deliveries
had skilled birth attendance in 2000, this propor-
tion had increased to 20% in 2006.22
Difficulties in access to maternal health care
In all four countries, use of maternal health care
services is limited despite increased inputs from
governments and international donors.24 Though
use of antenatal care, skilled birth attendance
and emergency obstetric care are mediated by a
range of factors, there is increasing evidence that
financial and other barriers are important in deter-
mining service uptake.1,25 Government and donor144investment in improvements in service availability,
training, drugs and equipment are offset by per-
sisting difficulties with access to care experienced
by poor women and their families.8 The barriers
women face are usually multiple and overlapping24
and include: a lack of information about where and
when to seek care; distance to a facility; substantial
direct and indirect costs; age and gender-based
norms concerning decision-making; the impact of
status and caste; the allocation of family resources
for women’s health, and socio-cultural norms favour-
ing home births over institutional deliveries.1,24,26 Of
these obstacles, the cost of services and other finan-
cial barriers are perceived by poor women as one
of the major reasons against delivering in a health
facility.2,3,27 Health policy and decision-makers have
therefore focused attention on mechanisms to
address the cost barriers that women face.1,8
Aims of demand-side financing for maternal
health care in South Asia
Demand-side financing interventions aim to chan-
nel funds and/or services to individuals who may
otherwise struggle to access them.1,2 In South Asia,
five major demand-side finance schemes piloted or
implemented to date are variants of cash transfer
schemes (Nepal, India) and voucher or voucher-like
schemes (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan). Cash transfers
reimburse users formonies spent onmaternal health
care services. It is hypothesised that cash incentives
will engender behaviour change and encourage
health-seeking behaviour.12 At the same time, they
are considered more relevant than simply free ser-
vice provision, as they often cover extra costs, such
as transport.3 If designed and implemented well,
it is argued that cash transfers are affordable and
cost-effective for funders and can be scaled up
easily.9 Both the major cash transfer schemes in
Nepal and India are deployed nationwide.
Rather than channelling funds direct to the user,
voucher schemes partially or wholly subsidise users
to purchase services from accredited providers.28 In
some schemes, physical vouchers are dispensed
with, but funders incentivise selected providers to
deliver their services at an affordable cost to women.2
Voucherschemesareusually targeted,and it is antici-
pated that this will improve access to care amongst
poor women.2 Voucher schemes allow women to
choose providers, and revenue earned by partici-
pating clinics is directly proportional to the number
of scheme users attending their facilities.29 It is
hoped that this will increase competition and, sub-
sequently, improve quality as providers compete to
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schemes.29 It is also argued that the accreditation
required for providers to join the scheme (the pro-
cess of which varies) can ensure minimum quality
standards.28 Voucher schemes are theoretically
viable in South Asia given its substantial private
sector, though as with cash transfer schemes, they
are not always implemented as planned.
At the same time, while the promotion of ante-
natal care, institutional delivery and post-partum
care should, in principle, realise the goal of reducing
maternal mortality,6,30,31 countervailing evidence
suggests that poor standards of care in India (for
example) continue to result in deficient services or
deaths among women who seek institutional deliv-
eries.16,32 These failures in both public and private
facilities include a lack of staff training, poor refer-
ral systems, weak accountability mechanisms and
inadequate information systems.16,32 The question
remains whether demand-side financing mecha-
nisms alone can improve quality of care sufficiently
to reduce maternal deaths.Characteristics, implementation and impact
of the schemes
Nepal
The Nepal Safer Motherhood Project 1997–2004
prompted significant policy interest in maternal
health.3,33,34 Research into costs consolidated sup-
port for demand-side financing, and the Safe Deliv-
ery Incentive Programme was launched in 2005.
Since 2009, it has continued within Nepal’s wider
Aama Programme and was recently rebranded
as Aama Surakshya Karyakram.13,35 At the time of
the scheme’s inception, the wife of the then Prime
Minister was a women’s activist and her strong sup-
port of the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme was
considered key in its introduction.3
The scheme, funded by the Government of
Nepal and UK Department for International Deve-
lopment, combines a cash incentive for women
with an incentive to public providers, with plans
ahead to roll it out to private providers.13 Women
are paid for delivery in a facility and some transport
costs, and women from the least developed districts
under the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme could
access health care for free (since the introduction
of Aama, free delivery is now universal).3,12 Skilled
providers are also incentivised for facility deliveries
and for home deliveries, given that difficult terrain
in Nepal renders many facilities inaccessible.27,36Health providers pay women in cash directly upon
discharge. Rather than target the scheme towards
the poorest, the government chose universal tar-
geting, ostensibly for equity though it is also easier
to manage and popular politically.12
Initially, the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme
was limited to women with two or fewer children,
with the aim of reducing the fertility rate. This con-
dition was later rescinded because it penalised the
poorest women.3 Uptake was slow initially, due
mainly to lengthy delays in the release of funds
to both providers and beneficiaries, confusion
caused by promoting both institutional and home
delivery, and a lack of transparency concerning
which health workers should receive what incen-
tive, which led to some resentment.12,37 The Aama
Programme reports that learning from the Safe
Delivery Incentive Programme is now reflected in
better management procedures,38 but while impact
of the universal free delivery service is emerging,13
a robust impact assessment of the cash transfer
part under the guise of Aama Surakshya Karyakram
is yet to emerge. As the Safe Delivery Incentive Pro-
gramme, estimates of coverage varied, but reports
suggested the scheme covered between 29%12 to
59%36 of eligible mothers in 2008–09. Reports sug-
gest home deliveries declined under the scheme
while facility deliveries and deliveries with skilled
attendance increased (Table 1).37 A small, explor-
atory and cross sectional descriptive study of the
Aama Surakshya Karyakram found that all the
mothers in their study (n=47) had received free
delivery services, but knowledge of the transport
incentive was limited, and the scheme is still strug-
gling to reach women in remote areas.35 At the
same time, confusion persists over the purpose of
the scheme. Women in the study knew there were
cash payments available, but were unsure exactly
what purpose they were for.35India
The Janani Suraksha Yojana (Safe Motherhood
Scheme) was launched in 2005 and is the largest
cash transfer scheme for maternal health care in
the world.14 Funded by central government, it is
administered through the National Rural Health
Mission, a temporary adjunct structure to the regu-
lar health directorate. Piloted in a small number of
states originally, the scheme expanded nationally
in 2008, but retains a focus on low-income states. In
the latter, targeting is universal and the cash incen-
tive higher.14 The scheme aims to normalise facility145
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delivery (see Table 2).14 A small amount of cash
is also available for home births. Originally, the
scheme was open to both public and private pro-
viders, but at this writing largely excludes the
private sector, though there is some state varia-
tion. The scheme has introduced a new type of
health worker – Accredited Social Health Activists
(ASHAs) – who are paid to accompany women to
antenatal check-ups, delivery and post-partum
visits. The scheme has seen rapid scale-up, with
US$275 million allocated to its budget in 2008–2009,
exceeding US$340 million in 2009–2010. Coverage
for 2010 was expected to be nearly a third of all
women giving birth in India that year. In practice,
however, coverage is highly variable, from less
than 5% to 44% in different states, while women
of middle income were found most likely to benefit
from the scheme.14 Nevertheless, available data
suggest institutional deliveries increased by 8%
in rural areas between 2002–2008.14 Reports
concerning poor quality of care are beginning to
emerge,16,39 placing question marks over the
ability of institutions to cope with the increased
demand. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some146states were unprepared for such rapid increases in
institutional deliveries.40
The other major demand-side financing scheme
implemented in India is the Chiranjeevi Yojana
(Scheme for Long Life), a public-private partnership
operating in Gujarat state (Table 2). The scheme
(best described as “voucher-like”) provides free
institutional delivery to poor women by contracting
out delivery services to private obstetricians. The
rationale for this scheme is that emergency obstetric
care is more widely available in Gujarat in private
services than in public services.43 Piloted initially in
a few districts, the scheme was rolled out state-wide
in 2007 under the supervision of a committed Health
Commissioner.43 The Government of Gujarat pays
a fixed pre-determined amount (US$ 5,447 for
100 deliveries) to each private obstetrician.44 This is
paid part in advance, part retrospectively. The flat
rate payment includes both normal and complicated
deliveries, to remove any incentive to carry out sur-
gical interventions.42,43 As well as free delivery, the
scheme provides free food and medicines after
delivery and reimbursement of transport costs for
accompanying family members.42,43 The scheme
is targeted at poor women and beneficiaries must
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specified certificate of poverty to access the services
free of charge. One study reports 865 of around
2,000 private practising obstetricians have joined
the scheme and coverage of deliveries among the
poor in the state averaged 53%.45 Another study
reports that 66% of Chiranjeevi Yojana beneficiaries
were satisfied with the services.43 So far, the scheme
attributes its successes to the widespread avail-
ability of private obstetrician–gynaecologists in
rural areas willing to collaborate with the gov-
ernment scheme,46 though other reports question
the popularity of the scheme among rural pro-
viders.47 Such claims, the efficacy of the scheme’s
incentives and declarations of transparency in its
financial arrangements, all need to be evaluated.
We could not find any data on the impact of the
scheme on utilisation of antenatal care, institutional
delivery or post-partum care.
Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, the Maternal Health Voucher Scheme
was launched in 2006 with external support from acombination of donors including UNFPA, WHO and
DFID. As with India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana, the
scheme is administered and delivered via a parallel
structure to the regular health directorate. The
scheme covers 46 of 493 upazilas (sub-districts)
nationally, providing vouchers to mainly poor
women with fewer than two children.29 The scheme
costs the funders US $41 per voucher distributed.48
The vouchers entitle the bearer to free antenatal
care, post-partum care and skilled birth attendance
(at home or in a facility) (Table 3).1 In addition to the
voucher, the scheme includes a cash incentive for
skilled birth attendance, transport costs, a gift pack-
age including food, and a cash incentive to providers
to offer free services.28 Health workers distribute
the vouchers to women, which are redeemable – in
theory – at both public and private facilities.
Since its inception, the scheme has reported a
rapid increase in the use of antenatal care, insti-
tutional delivery and post-partum care, which cor-
responds closely to an increase in voucher uptake.1,8
In a recent matched comparison study (the strongest
study design of any evaluation in the region so far),147
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delivery had increased by almost twofold.48 At the
same time, studies report women beneficiaries’
satisfaction with the scheme29 and increased equity
in access for poor women.8
Despite these considerable successes, the scheme
has encountered a number of difficulties, including
delays in the release of voucher funds, and con-
fusion over beneficiary selection criteria, both
of which are likely to impact on uptake of the
scheme. Reports suggest that the low level of funds
available and poor financial management have
failed to attract private providers. Competition
among providers has therefore not increased,
quality of care has not improved and participation
is limited to the public sector.29 In Bangladesh, the
scheme remunerates providers for caesarean sec-
tions, and reports suggest an increase in surgical
deliveries, but it is unclear if this is due to the
scheme and/or other factors.1,48 Recent data reveal
that out-of-pocket expenditure persists for women
beneficiaries of the scheme, indicating that the
scheme has not eliminated financial barriers to
maternal health care.48 Finally, questions remain
over the capacity of government facilities to cope
with the scheme in view of rapid increases in uti-
lisation. As in the other countries, there has been148little investigation into the impact on quality of
care of this surge in demand.
Pakistan
The USAID supported Sehat (Health) Voucher
Scheme was piloted in two districts in Southern
Punjab between 2008–2009. The services available
to women included three antenatal care visits,
normal delivery (referral in the case of caesarean
section) and one post-partum care visit (Table 4).50
The first pilot targeted 2,000 pregnant women in
one of the poorest districts in Pakistan (Dera Ghazi
Khan City), identified according to amenities in the
recipients’ neighbourhoods, income level and no
prior experience of delivery in a facility.2 The
scheme had no parity criteria; indeed, the women
who were sold the booklets had more children than
those who were not (38% had five or more chil-
dren).2,50 Women receiving vouchers could use
services provided by a network of pre-approved
private providers (part of the non-governmental
organisation Greenstar Social Marketing).2,50
Scheme beneficiaries made a one-off payment
of US$ 1.25 to Greenstar outreach workers for the
voucher booklet. The outreachworkers worked exten-
sively in communities promoting the schemes. After
providing the services, providers were reimbursed
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suggest the scheme was successful in selling almost
100% of its target of 2,000 booklets.50 One study
indicates an increase in institutional delivery asso-
ciated with participation in the voucher scheme,
with no secular trend showing an increase in facility
delivery during the same study period.2 The second
pilot, implemented in Jhang District was part-
government funded. Support for the scheme has
grown within the public sector (in particular, the
Punjab Director General-Health has been sup-
portive of the scheme). Reports in 2009 recom-
mended its continuation and scale-up, though this
has not yet happened.2,50Overall findings
In this review we have outlined the available infor-
mation to date on the key characteristics, imple-mentation and to a limited extent the impact of
demand-side financing schemes to improve access
to maternal health care in four countries in South
Asia. While each scheme differs in its finance
mechanism, incentives offered and target popula-
tion, the common aim has been to reduce financial
barriers to accessing maternity care. The intended
impact of these schemes is to encourage utilisation
of services in order to improve pregnancy out-
comes, particularly amongst the poor. Here we
reflect on the extent to which these types of
schemes have been shown to meet their intended
impact on utilisation, equity, quality of care, sus-
tainability, and maternal mortality and morbidity.
Utilisation
All schemes except India’s Chiranjeevi Yojana (for
which there are not yet reported data) report
increased utilisation of maternity services in areas
where they are operational.2,14,29,37 However, con-
founding factors need to be controlled for, to be
confident about causality.1 A number of factors
are likely to have an impact on uptake of services,
particularly inefficient disbursement of funds.
Slow payment of incentives can arise from bureau-
cratic mismanagement, or from rolling out a
scheme before it is ready because it is politically
expedient to do so. The delayed release of funds
will result in continued out-of-pocket payments
by women, or the need for providers to reimburse
eligible women from their own non-scheme funds.
As a result, service users’ trust may be eroded, not
just for maternity care, but for all health services,
and providers may avoid the schemes or perceive
them to be a financial liability.
Lack of clarity, systemisation and difficulties in
communicating policies to both implementers
and the public are also likely to diminish support.
For example, in Nepal, providers were confused
about the purpose of the scheme – ostensibly it
was to encourage facility delivery, yet incentives
were available for home delivery too. Lack of
clarity can de-motivate providers and adminis-
trators, which will impact on users’ perceptions.
In all cases, success will depend on workable
incentives and the willingness of providers to par-
ticipate. At the same time, lack of transparency
about health workers’ roles and responsibilities
can erode support for the schemes, as seen among
some workers in Nepal.12 Similarly, the role of the
new Accredited Social Health Activists deployed
by India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana will need to
be carefully examined. There are a number of149
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and possible duplication of roles has the potential
for dissatisfaction and conflict between them.
Alongside provider incentivisation, the schemes
depend for their successful promotion on mass
media campaigns and committed workers in the
community. Pakistan’s Sehat Voucher Scheme
was highly dependent on its outreach workers to
raise awareness of the scheme.2 What has emerged
from the literature is the importance of piloting the
schemes, clear direction from funders (whether
government or donors), training, close supervision,
regulation and monitoring.
Corruption
Where schemes involve financial incentives, policy-
makers, funders and administrators must be alert
to the possibility of misuse of funds, and some mis-
use has been reported.12,29 Cash transfer schemes
in particular involve the handling of large sums
of money which are disbursed directly to service
users and to some health workers by health cen-
tres. In the Nepal scheme, it was noted that the
use of cash rather than a voucher system meant
that money was transported from the district
health office to the health facility.12 Where bank
accounts and accountants do not exist, health
workers handle substantial funds and this carries
some risk. Where vouchers are used, there is
potential for facilities to claim reimbursements
for services not rendered. Pakistan’s Sehat Voucher
Scheme implemented spot checks in an attempt
to deter this.2
At the same time, extra funding provided for
surgical intervention can create perverse incen-
tives for unnecessary care. While there is a guard
against this in India’s Chiranjeevi Yojana (pro-
viders are paid a flat rate per 100 deliveries, with
an estimated proportion of complicated deliveries
factored in), in Bangladesh practitioners are
remunerated personally for conducting caesarean
sections. As noted, an increase in surgical inter-
vention has been observed in Bangladesh, though
it is not possible to pinpoint causation.1 By con-
trast, the risk in India’s Chiranjeevi Yojana appears
to be problems with referral of women with com-
plications, since there is no incentive for private
providers to accept them as patients. As the
majority of maternal deaths arise from complica-
tions, the frequent referral of complex cases by
private providers back to the public sector makes
us doubt the ability of such schemes to have an
impact on maternal mortality.150In all schemes, there must also be vigilance
about the possibility of persisting demands for pay-
ment of unofficial user fees, of which we have heard
anecdotal (but undocumented) evidence, when
women are supposed to be receiving free care.
Funding and sustainability
India’s two schemes are state funded, and this
suggests sustainability. Nevertheless, the parallel
structure used to deliver India’s Janani Suraksha
Yojana must be closely examined, particularly with
respect to the dangers of duplication and the
impact on sustainability where funding for the
structure is due to expire. Bangladesh’s Maternal
Health Voucher Scheme also operates via a paral-
lel platform; at the same time, the scheme entails
considerable financial commitment yet a clear
strategy on the part of the government to indepen-
dently support the scheme has not yet been estab-
lished.48 Nepal’s Aama Programme is also part
donor funded and this has raised concerns about
the lack of ownership at the district level.12 The
first pilot of Pakistan’s Sehat Voucher Scheme was
entirely donor-funded, though it has received some
public support for the second pilot.
A strong political champion has been a signifi-
cant boost to India’s Chiranjeevi Yojana and Nepal’s
and latterly to Pakistan’s schemes as well.2,3,45
Short-term or insecure funding sources inevitably
prompt urgent questions about scale-up and lon-
gevity. A major concern is the outcome when a
scheme comes to an end, and what happens when
both providers and women have come to expect
the financial incentives.48 The hope is that the
schemes will prompt so-called behaviour change,
but if the main aim of the schemes is to remove
financial barriers, the point is not behaviour. In any
case, it is not yet possible to evaluate the long-term
impact of any of the schemes described here.
Equity
Demand-side financing aims to redress inequitable
access to health care, but targeting is often dif-
ficult.51 In some areas, the majority of house-
holds are likely to be poor, and schemes in Nepal,
Bangladesh and India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana
are universal due to the impracticality of socio-
economic targeting.1,14 Criteria based on number
of children are often considered discriminatory,
since the poorest women are likely to have more
children. Nepal has subsequently removed this
condition, but it remains in Bangladesh for fear
of encouraging higher fertility.1 India’s Chiranjeevi
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to be confident in their reports that the majority
of their beneficiaries are poor,2,42,43 though if
schemes are not adequately reaching rural areas
this raises question marks about capacity to reach
the poor. Among all schemes, more effort is needed
to ensure that the poorest and most marginalised
have equitable access to the benefits, especially
those schemes that are now universal.30 It is also
possible that adoption of universal targeting may
derive from political motivation to gain popularity
with voters.12,28 Above all, when designing schemes
intended to benefit specific groups, the opinions
and needs of those groups should be sought, but
they rarely are.
Quality of care
Few studies or reports focus on the quality of care
provided in facilities that participate in these
schemes. In both public and private sectors, it is
anticipated that competition between providers
for incentives will act as a catalyst for improve-
ments to quality of maternity care. While there is
evidence that utilisation of services has gone up,
there is less evidence that the schemes have led to
improvements in services. For example, Bangladesh’s
scheme has not increased competitiveness or attracted
private providers,29 and India’s Janani Suraksha
Yojana scheme has largely excluded private pro-
viders. The rationale for this needs to be explored.
Preliminary assessments across schemes have
found that service quality, in general, remains
poor.8,37,49 Intuitively, a rapid increase in utilisa-
tion is likely to place a considerable burden on
facilities and compromise quality in the short
term, and there is no evidence to suggest that this
has stimulated expansion of or improvements in
services. Given the limited extra capacity in public
and private sector facilities in South Asia, scheme
funds need to focus not just on widening access,
but on ensuring that facilities can cope with the
increased demand they tend to generate. Quality
is both a supply and demand issue.
Maternal, perinatal and neonatal
mortality outcomes
Improvements in mortality outcomes are the ulti-
mate goal of these schemes, but in this review we
did not identify any robust evaluations of impact
on mortality outcomes; most of the studies we
included were cross-sectional or before and after
studies, plus one controlled study but without
randomisation. Although the MMR in general inSouth Asia is slowly improving,19 reports suggest
only modest improvements in maternal mortality
as a result of the Janani Suraksha Yojana scheme,
but this should be interpreted as suggestive of the
scheme’s potential to impact on mortality, rather
than proof that it is effective.14 Indeed, there are
concerns that the huge scale of such demand-side
financing schemes may be diverting attention and
funds away from other worthy maternal health
initiatives. Elsewhere in the region, evidence for
the impact on mortality is inconclusive, particu-
larly since it is difficult to distinguish the impact
of the schemes from general investment in mater-
nal health (for example, in improvements to emer-
gency obstetric care facilities).1 As MMR is difficult
to measure accurately without vital statistics, skilled
attendance at birth has proven a popular proxy
indicator of improvements in maternal health,
with governments eager to show progress toward
MDG 5.52 In reality, this leaves us with a narrow
conception of maternal health, disregarding still-
births, miscarriage or induced abortion.52Conclusions
Several important questions remain. In the public
sector, key questions include the implications of
delivering the schemes through parallel structures
to health directorates and whether regular gov-
ernment funding might be directed and used
more efficiently. In the private sector, it is unclear
whether the schemes are successful in attracting
and involving providers and whether competition
has any influence over quality of care. Where
schemes are funded extensively through donor
support, sustainability is a key concern, as is the
uncertainty that comes with never knowing how
long these schemes will continue. Importantly,
our review highlights problems with targeting
the poor, especially in universal schemes, and this
could be overcome in part by involving commu-
nities and specific target groups in their design.
At present there is a lack of depth and breadth
in the evidence base of what has been measured.
A key question for future research is to what
extent demand-side financing schemes for mater-
nal health care meet the needs of women. The
answer is not always obvious, and women them-
selves are rarely consulted. Research that uses
qualitative methods to explore women’s and
family members’ views and experiences of these
schemes will help to understand what is impor-
tant to women in choosing where to seek care151
K Jehan et al. Reproductive Health Matters 2012;20(39):142–154and deliver their babies. Future research should
also provide rigorous evaluation of the quality of
care provided by public and private facilities
participating in the schemes. Focussing solely on
raising demand will not, in itself, reduce mater-
nal mortality or morbidity, and it is prudent to
remember that skilled attendance at birth should152not be the only indicator of improvements in mater-
nal health. Indeed, poor quality of care in facilities
should place a question mark over this assumption.
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Au Népal, en Inde, au Bangladesh et au Pakistan,
la politique centrée sur l’élargissement de l’accès
aux services de maternité a débouché sur des
mesures de réduction des obstacles financiers
qui empêchent les femmes d’avoir accès aux
soins, plus précisément des transferts de fonds
ou des chèques conçus pour stimuler la demande,
notamment de soins prénatals, obstétricaux et du
post-partum. Pourtant, en dépit de leur popularité,
on sait peu de choses de l’impact de ces programmes.
L’article décrit cinq interventions majeures : le
programme Aama (des mères) (élément de transfert
de fonds) au Népal, le Janani Suraksha Yojana (plan
de maternité sans risque) en Inde, le Chiranjeevi
Yojana (plan pour une longue vie) en Inde, le projet
de chèques de santé maternelle au Bangladesh et le
système de chèques Sehat (santé) au Pakistan. Il
examine les objectifs, les justificatifs, les obstacles
à l’application, les résultats connus, le potentiel
et les limites de chaque projet, avec les données
disponibles. Un recours accru aux services de santé
maternelle a été enregistré depuis le début des
projets, mais sans qu’il soit possible de déterminer
les améliorations de la santé maternelle, faute
d’études contrôlées. L’étude recense les domaines
d’amélioration des projets qui ont besoin d’une
gestion opérationnelle plus efficace, de directives
claires, de transparence financière, de plans de
viabilité, de preuves d’équité et, surtout, de confirmer
leur impact sur la qualité des soins, et la mortalité
15451. Bellows N, Bellows B, Warren C. The use of vouchers
for reproductive health services in developing countries:
systematic review. Journal of Tropical Medicine and
International Health 2011;16(1):84–96.
52. Austveg B. Perpetuating power: some reasons why
reproductive health has stalled. Reproductive Health
Matters 2011;19(38):26–34.Resumen
En Nepal, India, Bangladesh y Pakistán, debido a
políticas centradas en mejorar el acceso a los
servicios de maternidad, se ha intentado reducir
las barreras de costo que impiden el acceso de
las mujeres a los servicios: específicamente,
transferencias de dinero o programas de cupones
diseñados para estimular la demanda de los
servicios, incluida la atención antes, durante y
después del parto. Pese a su popularidad, no se
sabe mucho acerca de su impacto o eficacia. En
este artículo se resumen cinco intervenciones
importantes: el Programa de Madres (transferencias
de dinero) en Nepal; el Plan por una Maternidad
sin Riesgos y el Plan por una Vida Larga, ambos en
India; el Programa de Cupones para Servicios de
Salud Materna en Bangladesh; y el Programa de
Cupones para servicios de salud, en Pakistán. Se
analizan los objetivos, la justificación y los retos
de la implementación, los resultados, el potencial
y las limitaciones de cada plan según los datos.
Desde el inicio de estos planes, ha aumentado el
uso de los servicios de salud materna, aunque por
falta de estudios controlados no hay evidencia de
mejoras en los resultados. Entre las áreas a mejorar
figuran: la eficiencia de la administración operativa,
directrices claras, transparencia financiera, planes de
sostenibilidad,evidenciadeequidady, sobre todo,un
impacto comprobado en la calidad de la atención y
en las tasas de mortalidad y morbilidad maternas.et morbidité maternelles.
